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Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting
Through the Dole Loopholes
Celestine Richards McConville*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, the Supreme Court steadily has
limited the scope of congressional power in the name of federal-
ism. In the context of the Commerce Clause, the Court twice has
invalidated federal legislation involving intrastate criminal activ-
ity, ruling that such activity lacks the requisite “substantial ef-
fect” on interstate commerce necessary to sustain an exercise of
the commerce power.1 The Court also has ruled that, even when
* Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. B.A. 1988, Boston
University; J.D. 1991, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Tom Mc-
Conville, without whose support, patience and encouragement this paper would not have
become a reality. Special thanks to Tony Arnold, both for his many thought-provoking dis-
cussions and for his insightful comments on a prior draft. Thanks also to Melvyn Durchslag
and Jonathan Entin, not only for their valuable input on a prior draft, but also for so gra-
ciously acting as my mentors. Thanks to the symposium participants—Lynn Baker, Denis
Binder, Erwin Chemerinsky, Richard Epstein, Earl Maltz and Bradley Smith—for their
spirited and useful debate during the symposium.  Thanks to Denis Binder for his expert
advice, and for his useful comments on prior drafts.
1 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating provision of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act prohibiting possession of firearms within 1000 feet of schools); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating provision of the Violence Against Wo-
men Act establishing civil damage remedy against persons who commit gender-motivated
violent crimes). The substantial effect restriction is necessary, the Court reasoned, because
“[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local.” Id. at 676 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568).
The Court suggested in Lopez, and made clear in Morrison, that the federal govern-
ment may not regulate criminal activity under the Commerce Clause if the only basis for
the regulation is the activity’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at
559-68; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 676. While the Morrison Court carefully noted that it was not
“adopt[ing] a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity,”
it emphasized that its cases “have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activ-
ity only where that activity is economic in nature.” Id. at 673.
Before the Court this Term was another Commerce Clause case, this one challenging
the federal government’s regulatory authority under section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act.
The government contended it had authority under that section and the Commerce Clause
to regulate activity involving wholly intrastate ponds serving as migratory bird habitats.
See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corp of Eng’rs, 121 S. Ct.
675 (2001). On January 9, 2001, the Court rejected the government’s interpretation of sec-
tion 404(a), ruling that the phrase “navigable waters” in that section does not include
wholly intrastate ponds that serve as migratory bird habitats when the ponds are “not
adjacent to open water.” Id. at 680. Because the government’s assertion of authority was
improper on statutory grounds, the Court did not address the Commerce Clause question.
The Court did state, however, that the government’s position raised “significant constitu-
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Congress properly regulates an activity under its commerce
power, federalism principles prohibit Congress from using that
power to direct the states to enact, administer or enforce a federal
program.2 Such directives “commandeer” state legislative and ex-
ecutive processes, which are critical aspects of state sovereign au-
thority.3 Finally, the Court has curtailed Congress’s ability to
abrogate, and obtain waivers of, state sovereign immunity.4
To date, the Court’s federalism campaign has left untouched
one of Congress’s most broad and potent powers—the spending
power.5 As currently interpreted, this power permits Congress to
achieve objectives with respect to the states that it otherwise
could not achieve using its other Article I enumerated powers.6 In
other words, Congress may use federal funds to induce the states
to enact particular legislation or to regulate in a particular man-
ner, even though Congress could not directly mandate that the
states do so.7 As several commentators have noted, the current
tional and federalism questions.” Id. at 684. Thus, while a decision on the merits of the
Commerce Clause issue likely would have provided additional insight regarding the
Court’s view of the scope of the commerce power, the Court’s decision reveals its continued
interest in examining whether congressional legislation exceeds a federalism-based outer
limit on the commerce power.
2 Under the so-called “anti-commandeering” rule, Congress may induce states,
through the valid use of one of its powers, to enact or enforce a federal program, but it may
not require the states to enact or enforce a federal program. Thus, in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court invalidated the provisions of the Federal Low Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act that required states to either “take title” to
radioactive waste within their borders or to enact legislation dealing with the disposal of
such waste. And in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Court invalidated the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act provisions that required, on a temporary basis,
state and local chief law enforcement officers to conduct reasonable background checks of
prospective handgun purchasers.
3 See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 926-27, 932.
4 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Congress may not use its
commerce power to abrogate sovereign immunity); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680, 681-85 (1999) (overruling Parden v.
Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), and refusing to imply a waiver
because of a “state’s mere presence in a field subject to congressional regulation” or because
a state participates in an activity normally engaged in by private entities); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Congress ex-
ceeded its authority under § 5 of the 14th Amendment when it imposed monetary liability
on states for patent infringement); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity in state courts); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000) (Congress exceeded its authority under § 5 of the 14th Amendment when it
permitted damages actions against states for violations of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act); Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, No. 99-1240, 2001 WL
173556, __U.S.__ (Feb. 21, 2001) (Congress exceeded its authority under § 5 of the 14th
Amendment when it permitted federal court damages actions by state employees against
states for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
5 In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), a bare majority
of the Court declined an opportunity to cut back on the spending power in the name of
federalism. For a discussion of Davis, see infra, notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
6 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
7 See New York, 505 U.S. 144.
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broad scope of the spending power undermines the Court’s recent
federalism decisions because it permits an end-run around the
federalism limits imposed on other enumerated powers.8
The evidence suggests that the spending power is next up on
the Court’s federalism hit-list. In South Dakota v. Dole, the Su-
preme Court carefully warned that although the spending power
has a broad reach, the power also has outer limits.9 And it re-
peated its warning in later cases.10 As discussed in Part II, “feder-
alism loopholes” built into Dole’s analysis might be used as tools
for cutting back on the scope of the spending power in order to
vindicate federalism interests. These loopholes include coercion
(the possibility that “pressure might turn into compulsion”), inad-
equate notice (an ambiguous statement of the funding condition),
and insufficient relatedness between the funding condition and
the purpose of the federal spending program.11 This article evalu-
ates whether these three federalism loopholes ought to be used
8 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1911, 1916 (1995); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the “Sounds of Sover-
eignty” but Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11,
15-16 (1998); Ryan C. Squire, Effectuating Principles of Federalism: Reevaluating the Fed-
eral Spending Power as the Great Tenth Amendment Loophole, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 869 (1998);
Julian Epstein, Evolving Spheres of Federalism After U.S. v. Lopez and Other Cases, 34
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 553 (1997).
9 483 U.S. at 207-12.
10 See New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (“[Funding] conditions must (among other require-
ments) bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending, otherwise, of course,
the spending power could render academic the Constitution’s other grants and limits of
federal authority.”) (citations omitted); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999) (“[I]n cases involving conditions attached to
federal funding, we have acknowledged that the financial inducement offered by Congress
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.”) (quota-
tions and citations omitted). See also Candice Hoke, State Discretion Under New Federal
Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality and a Federalism-Based Constitutional Challenge, 9
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 115, 121, 122 (1998) (suggesting that the Court may reevaluate
spending power in light of New York and Printz); but see Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The
Next Generation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1629, 1662 (2000) (increased use of spending power
“might eventually force the pro-federalism majority on the Court to rework its spending
power jurisprudence or even reconsider Dole, although there are few indications of such a
development at the present time”); Krotoszynski, supra note 8, at 16 (“To date, the Su-
preme Court has shown no indication to revisit its holding in South Dakota v. Dole.”).
The existence of similar warnings in the Commerce Clause context cautions us to take
the Court’s admonitions seriously. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937) (“Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the light of our dual
system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society,
would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government.”); cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264, 310 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[I]t would be a mis-
take to conclude that Congress’ power to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause is
unlimited. Some activities may be so private or local in nature that they simply may not be
in commerce.”).
11 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08. These loopholes did not appear for the first time in Dole.
See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (coercion); Pennhurst State Sch.
and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (notice); Massachusetts v. United States, 435
U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion) (relatedness).
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either to promote sovereign accountability or to encourage Con-
gress to be cognizant of federalism concerns when it legislates. All
loopholes are not created equal, of course. So while the article dis-
cusses all three loopholes, it focuses predominantly on the coer-
cion loophole, which has received much recent attention in both
scholarship and case law.12
As discussed in Part III, a primary justification for judicial
enforcement of the federal balance is to preserve and protect the
states’ ability to act as sovereigns.13 In their capacity as sovereigns
the states are charged with the duty to make decisions imple-
menting the will of their people, and the responsibility to be held
accountable when they fail in this duty.14 Accordingly, judicial in-
vocation of the Dole loopholes can be justified if the loopholes
would protect sovereign accountability by eliminating interference
with the states’ ability to make decisions implementing the will of
their people.
The coercion loophole left open in Dole should not be used as a
means of enforcing federalism-based limits. As defined in Dole,
that loophole improperly emphasizes financial inducement, exam-
ining whether the amount of money at stake essentially “caused”
the state to participate or remain in the federal program. As ex-
plained in detail in Part III, in the federalism context, coercion
means the loss of sovereign accountability, not subjection to undue
influence or financial inducement. Thus, to say that the federal
government may not use the federal spending power to coerce a
state is simply to restate the rule that the federal government
may not interfere with sovereign accountability. If the federal pro-
gram itself does not interfere with the state’s ability to make
choices on behalf of its people (which federalism protects), then by
necessity there is no coercion. While the financial impact of a
funding condition may well inform the decision to participate in a
federal program, it does not disable the state from choosing to im-
12 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 8, at 1973-77; David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power,
44 DUKE L.J. 1, 78-86 (1994); Hoke, supra note 10, at 121; Angel D. Mitchell, Conditional
Federal Funding to the States: The New Federalism Demands a Close Examination for Un-
constitutional Conditions, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 161, 191-93 (1999); see also, e.g., Nevada v.
Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990); California v.
United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997); Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196 (10th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 623 (2000); Virginia Dept. of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559
(4th Cir. 1997).
13 For thorough and informative discussions of the purposes and values of federalism,
see Engdahl, supra note 12, and Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty:
The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979).
14 These themes sound in both old and new Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Stew-
ard Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 593 (concluding that the Social Security Act did not “call for a
surrender by the states of powers essential to their quasi sovereign existence”); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (federalism promotes accountability because
“state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; [and] state offi-
cials remain accountable to the people”).
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plement the people’s will, and thus decline the federal funds, if
that will is inconsistent with the federal condition. The choice may
be difficult, but the ability of the state to make a choice remains
unimpaired.
Unlike the coercion loophole, the inadequate notice loophole
protects sovereign accountability. Adequate notice of a funding
condition enables a state to make an informed choice about
whether participation would be responsive to the will of its people.
Because unambiguous notice of the condition directly affects a
state’s ability to act as a sovereign, the inadequate notice loophole
ought to be used to protect our federalism.
Lastly, use of the insufficient relatedness loophole will not en-
hance a state’s ability to determine whether participation in the
federal spending program would implement the preferences of its
constituents. The degree of relatedness between the funding con-
dition and the purpose of the federal spending program may well
inform a state’s decision to participate or not participate. Indeed,
a low degree of relatedness might counsel against participation, as
it might send a negative signal about the whole program. But the
degree of relatedness should not affect a state’s ability to deter-
mine whether the program will enhance or impede its policy
choices, and thus should not be used to directly enforce federalism
limits.
Part IV examines a second justification for invoking some or
all of the Dole loopholes—encouraging Congress to be attentive to
the federal balance when it enacts legislation involving or affect-
ing the states. While the coercion loophole likely would encourage
Congress to be sensitive to federalism concerns, it should not be
used for that purpose because doing so would result in the invali-
dation of proper exercises of the spending power. It therefore is too
blunt an instrument to remedy congressional insensitivity. The in-
adequate notice and insufficient relatedness loopholes, however,
serve this encouragement function well. Judicial invalidation of a
spending condition for lack of clarity or for insufficient relatedness
forces Congress to re-craft its program before it can continue. And
even in the initial drafting stage, the threat of possible invalida-
tion likely will pressure Congress to carefully consider state
interests.
In short, the inadequate notice and insufficient relatedness
loopholes provide possible avenues for vindication of federalism
interests. The Dole coercion loophole, on the other hand, does not
protect federalism interests and thus should not be used as a tool
for doing so.
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II. THE DOLE DECISION — PLANTING THE SEEDS OF FEDERALISM
Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the United States Constitution
authorizes Congress to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States.”15 The main debate sur-
rounding the scope of the Spending Clause was the definition of
general welfare. James Madison argued that the phrase was lim-
ited by the enumerated powers following the Spending Clause,
and that Congress could spend only to achieve an object within
those enumerated powers.16 Alexander Hamilton took the opposite
view, asserting that the power to spend for the general welfare
was not restricted by the enumerated powers, but rather was a
distinct power unencumbered by the remaining grants of power.17
It was not until 1936, in United States v. Butler, that the Supreme
Court took a position on the issue and rejected Madison’s interpre-
tation as a “mere tautology.”18 Adopting Hamilton’s position, the
Court ruled that the “power of Congress to authorize expenditure
of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”19
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court confirmed But-
ler’s broad vision of the federal spending power.20 South Dakota
challenged a federal law that conditioned the receipt of a portion
of federal highway funds on the adoption of a minimum drinking
age of twenty-one.21 Rejecting the challenge, the Court under-
scored the “breadth” of the spending power, emphasizing that
Congress may “further broad policy objectives by conditioning re-
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
16 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
17 See Alexander Hamilton, in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, DECEMBER
1791-JANUARY 1792, at 303 (Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1966) (“This phrase
is as comprehensive as any that could have been used; because it was not fit that the con-
stitutional authority of the Union, to appropriate its revenues shou’d have been restricted
within narrower limits than the ‘General Welfare’ and because this necessarily embraces a
vast variety of particulars, which are susceptible neither of specification nor of definition.”);
see Butler, 297 U.S. at 65 (“Hamilton . . . maintained the clause confers a power separate
and distinct from those later enumerated is not restricted in meaning by the grant of
them”).
18 297 U.S. at 65.
19 Id. at 66. Butler emphasized that the power was not without limitation, but must be
exercised for the general welfare. Id. After declaring that the spending power was not lim-
ited by the enumerated powers, the Court nevertheless proceeded to strike down the Act
under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 68. Because the Act regulated agriculture, it was be-
yond the federal government’s reach. Id. As Professor David E. Engdahl so aptly explains:
“The rule of decision in Butler . . . is precisely Madison’s view, applied notwithstanding the
Court’s simultaneous nominal endorsement of Hamilton’s view. The majority’s seeming ob-
liviousness to this flagrant self-contradiction makes its opinion in Butler one of the few
truly ridiculous opinions delivered in two centuries of Supreme Court jurisprudence.” Eng-
dahl, supra note 12, at 36 (footnote omitted). The 10th Amendment analysis in Butler has
not been followed.
20 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
21 Id.
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ceipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with fed-
eral and administrative directives.”22 Thus, the Court held that
Congress may use “the spending power and the conditional grant
of federal funds” in order to obtain “objectives not thought to be
within Article I’s enumerated legislative fields.”23
Even while it defended a sweeping spending power, the Court
warned that the spending power was subject to several restric-
tions. In this part of the Dole analysis we see the creation of feder-
alism loopholes that the states might use to allege that the federal
government has overstepped its bounds and intruded on state sov-
ereign authority.
The first restriction—and the only one contained in the text of
the Spending Clause—requires that the spending be for the gen-
eral welfare.24 As to the precise content of this term, the courts
must “defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.”25 Invoking
the required deference, the Court had no problem concluding that
Congress’s desire to address the problem of drinking and driving
promoted the general welfare.26 The second restriction requires
Congress to state unambiguously the conditions it wishes to place
on the receipt of federal funds. This notice requirement ensures
that state participation in a federal program is knowing and vol-
untary.27 It was satisfied easily in Dole, where the Court found
that “[t]he conditions upon which States receive the funds . . .
could not be more clearly stated by Congress.”28
The third restriction requires some degree of relatedness be-
tween the spending condition and the purpose of the federal
spending program.29 Opting not to define the precise contours of
the relatedness requirement, the Court held that the minimum
drinking age condition satisfied the requirement because it di-
rectly related to a primary purpose of highway expenditures—
highway safety.30 Evidence indicated that young persons would
drive across state lines in order to consume alcohol legally,
thereby increasing the incidence of drinking and driving on our
nation’s highways. A uniform minimum drinking age reasonably
would prevent this occurrence.31
22 Id. at 206.
23 Id. at 207.
24 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
25 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
26 Id. at 208.
27 Id. at 207.
28 Id. at 208.
29 Id. at 207.
30 The Court specifically declined to address whether a condition, at a minimum, must
directly relate to the purpose of the federal spending program, or whether conditions less
directly related would suffice. Id. at 208-09 n.3.
31 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208-09 n.3 (1987).
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The fourth restriction recognizes that independent constitu-
tional provisions might bar the spending condition. After review-
ing its precedent, the Court concluded that this restriction simply
means that the federal spending condition may not require the
states to engage in behavior that violates the Constitution.32 The
Court rejected South Dakota’s argument that this restriction pro-
hibited Congress from using the spending power to achieve objec-
tives it could not achieve under its other enumerated powers.33
South Dakota’s argument urged nothing more than the adoption
of Madison’s view of the Spending Clause—a view the Court al-
ready had rejected. The Court also rejected the idea that funding
conditions impermissibly invade state sovereignty in violation of
the 10th Amendment.34 As long as the state can choose against the
funding condition, there is no violation.35
Finally, the Court noted that a spending condition might be
invalidated if the “financial inducement offered by Congress [is] so
coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compul-
sion.”36 After suggesting that coercion might be difficult to prove,
the Court ruled that South Dakota’s loss of only five percent of its
federal highway funds was insufficient to demonstrate coercion.37
Three potential federalism loopholes appear in Dole’s spend-
ing analysis:  inadequate notice, coercion, and insufficient related-
ness. Under the inadequate notice loophole, a simple finding of
ambiguity can torpedo disfavored spending conditions. The coer-
cion and insufficient relatedness loopholes are such simply be-
cause they are still works-in-progress. Some observers have
criticized Dole for being insufficiently rigorous and for failing to
define the scope of the coercion and relatedness restrictions.38 But
what was once a weakness might now be a strength from a feder-
alism perspective, for the Court’s very failure to give definitive
content to the coercion and relatedness restrictions presents a po-
tential opportunity for the federalism movement. By leaving to fu-
ture cases the job of defining the parameters of these restrictions,
the Court has provided an avenue for federalism proponents to
challenge spending conditions as disruptive of the federal balance.
32 Id. at 210.
33 Id.
34 “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
35 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
36 Id. at 211 (quotation omitted).
37 Id. at 211-12.
38 See, e.g., Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s
Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 86-87, 102-03, 115-23; Kimberly Sayers-Fay, Condi-
tional Federal Spending: A Back Door to Enhanced Free Exercise Protection, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1281, 1299 (2000) (describing Dole analysis as “extremely generous,” and asserting
that it “signals [Congress] that it does have substantial latitude”).
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Thus, rather than sanctioning congressional carte blanche, the
Dole decision leaves open possible opportunities to cut back on
congressional authority.39
Parts III and IV evaluate whether and how these loopholes
ought to be used to cut back the reach of the federal spending
power in the name of federalism.
III. PROTECTING STATE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY
The federalism structure of our government divides power be-
tween the federal and state governments. As is well chronicled in
the Supreme Court’s federalism decisions, our federalism arrange-
ment serves many purposes, perhaps the most important of which
is to promote and protect individual liberty.40 Dividing “the atom
of sovereignty” ensures that the state and federal governments
will act as a check on each other.41 Alexander Hamilton described
this checking function as follows: “Power being almost always the
rival of power, the general government will at all times stand
ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and
these will have the same disposition towards the general govern-
ment.”42 And the Supreme Court has observed that “[i]n the ten-
sion between the federal and state power lies the promise of
liberty.”43
The division of authority between the state and federal gov-
ernments also provides the people with an opportunity to partici-
pate in their own governance, to have a voice in substantive
39 Although the general welfare restriction arguably could be used as a loophole
through which federalism-based interests might emerge, see John Eastman, Restoring the
“General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2001), the Court’s extreme
deference to legislative judgment in this area suggests that it is not a likely candidate for
such limitations. Indeed, the Dole Court went so far as to suggest that the general welfare
restriction might not be “judicially enforceable.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 n.2. Moreover, the
Court’s Spending Clause cases continually reaffirm the Hamiltonian vision of general wel-
fare, and contain no suggestion that the Court might more narrowly define that term. This
is telling when compared to the Court’s Commerce Clause precedent, which laid the
groundwork for judicial imposition of outer limits on the commerce power. See NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
40 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157-59 (1992); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997).
41  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
42 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
James Madison made the same point in Federalist No. 51: “In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct govern-
ments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate de-
partments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
43 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
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decision-making that inevitably will affect their lives.44 Professor
David E. Engdahl captured this idea well when he stated that
“[t]he purpose [of federalism] is not to debilitate governance, but
to enhance popular influence on public policy choices and to im-
prove answerability for their consequences.”45 By promoting and
protecting state sovereign accountability, federalism enhances
both access to the political process and accountability for political
decisions.46 States must be free to make decisions on behalf of
their constituents, choosing which course of action best imple-
ments the will of the people.47 This decision-making ability is the
essence of sovereign accountability.
Judicial enforcement of federalism-based limits is necessary
in order to protect state accountability and, ultimately, individual
liberty. Accordingly, the courts should invoke only those Dole loop-
holes that are designed to eliminate interference with the states’
ability to make a decision implementing the will of their people.
As discussed below, only the inadequate notice loophole is so
designed.
A. The Coercion Loophole
Dole suggested that coercion in the spending context occurs
when a state simply cannot resist the lure of federal funding; the
“financial inducement” of a funding condition might be so strong
as to constitute unconstitutional coercion.48 Without defining
when financial “pressure turns into compulsion,” the Court indi-
cated that the presence or absence of coercion likely would turn on
the amount of federal financing at stake.49 In Dole, South Dakota
was not coerced since it lost only five percent of otherwise availa-
ble highway funds by refusing to participate in the federal spend-
ing program.50 Following Dole’s lead, some lower federal courts
have evaluated coercion claims using the amount of federal fund-
ing at stake or the impact on the state of losing federal funding.51
44 Id. at 458 (federalism “increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes”).
45 Engdahl, supra note 12, at 8.
46 Id.
47 See infra notes 53-84 and accompanying text. A state’s freedom to make decisions
on behalf of its constituents of course may be limited when authorized by the Constitution.
Thus, under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, the federal government,
acting pursuant to an enumerated power, may preempt state legislation. See generally LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-5, at 656-57 (3d ed. 2000).
48 453 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., Virginia Dept. of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997); Jim C. v.
United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Missouri v. United States, 918 F.
Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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Reliance on a financial inducement definition of coercion obvi-
ously makes a finding of coercion more likely as the amount of
federal funding available to the states increases.52 But as demon-
strated below, Dole’s coercion loophole should not be invoked for
two reasons. First, the presence or absence of coercion in the fed-
eralism context does not turn on the amount of federal funding at
stake or the impact on state resources of losing the funding. In-
stead, it turns on whether the funding condition interferes with
the state’s sovereign accountability. Second, as defined in Dole to
mean financial inducement, the coercion loophole does not elimi-
nate interference with the state’s ability to make a choice on be-
half of its people.
1. Coercion in the Federalism Context
The emphasis on voluntary participation in federal spending
programs likely is responsible for the financial inducement defini-
tion of coercion that surfaced in Dole and that is used by some
lower federal courts. The constitutional validity of federal spend-
ing conditions depends on each state’s voluntary decision to par-
ticipate in the federal spending program.53 Thus, any evidence
that the decision was somehow involuntary would undermine fed-
eral authority. A large enough sum of money, the argument goes,
might well render a state incapable of rejecting the funding condi-
tion and refusing to participate in the spending program.54  Under
this analysis, the decision to participate would be involuntary,
and the funding condition coercive and invalid.
The “financial inducement” analysis misunderstands the
meaning of both voluntariness and coercion in the federalism con-
text. In that context, voluntariness and coercion have to do with
the ability of a state to make decisions as a sovereign. Thus, coer-
cion exists (and the decision is involuntary) when a state cannot,
by reason of the federal action, respond to and implement the will
of its people, and the people of that state cannot hold its repre-
sentatives accountable for the decision.55 Coercion implicates a
state’s ability to act as a representative of its people, not the
state’s level of temptation in choosing among alternatives.56 The
52 In 1999, an estimated 26% of the states’ expenditures came from federal funds. See
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (119th ed.) (1999) at
323 (including Puerto Rico).
53 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 210; Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1, 17 (1981).
54 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
55 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (“The Constitution . . . contemplates that a State’s government will
represent and remain accountable to its own citizens.”).
56 Cf. Engdahl, supra note 12, at 82-83 (asserting that “there is reason to doubt that
the concepts of coercion and undue influence ‘can ever be applied with fitness to the rela-
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prohibition on coercion, then, is nothing more than the prohibition
on interfering with sovereign accountability. If the federal pro-
gram does not interfere with a state’s ability to choose whether
and how to implement the will of its people, then by necessity
there is no coercion. Examples of coercion thus would include pro-
viding erroneous information regarding the effect of participation
in the program, failing to provide relevant information regarding
such participation, and directing the states to legislate, adminis-
ter or enforce federal policies.57
A long line of Supreme Court precedent supports this view of
coercion in the federalism context. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
Court confronted a challenge to the Maternity Act, a federal
spending program designed to improve maternal and infant
health.58 To receive federal funding, the states had to comply with
certain conditions, including having the relevant state agencies
file “reports concerning their operations and expenditures.”59
Funding would be withdrawn if a state made improper expendi-
tures.60 Although the Court ultimately dismissed the case for lack
of standing, the Court commented that the federal spending pro-
gram “impose[d] no obligation” on the state, “but simply ex-
tend[ed] an option which the state [was] free to accept or reject.”61
The Court also noted that the federal program did not “require the
states to do or to yield anything.”62  Though not a ruling on the
merits, the clear import of this commentary is that the regulation
was not coercive because it did not interfere with the state’s abil-
ity to make decisions implementing (or not implementing) the will
of the people. The states remain able to make policy decisions for
their citizens, and the citizens in turn may hold their state repre-
sentatives accountable for those decisions.
The concept of coercion appeared again in Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis and the Court dealt with it in much the same man-
ner.63 Steward Machine involved a challenge to provisions of the
Social Security Act imposing a tax on employers, and crediting
against that tax payments made by the employers to a state un-
employment fund.64 The allegation in Steward was that the “domi-
nant end and aim [of the statute was] to drive the state
Legislatures under the whip of economic pressure into the enact-
tions between state and nation’”) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
57 See New York, 505 U.S. 144 (federal government may not compel states to enact a
federal program).
58 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 480.
62 Id. at 482.
63 301 U.S 548 (1937).
64 Employers could obtain a credit of up to 90% of the federal tax owed. See id. at 574.
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ment of unemployment compensation laws at the bidding of the
central government.”65 The Court rejected the argument, reason-
ing that “it confuses motive with coercion.”66 In an oft-quoted pas-
sage the Court asserted that “to hold that motive or temptation is
equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties.
The outcome of such a doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical
determinism by which choice becomes impossible.”67
Steward Machine associated coercion with “destroying or im-
pairing the autonomy of the states.”68 In the context of state deci-
sion-making, Steward Machine placed great reliance on the fact
that the federal program did not require the states to “surrender
. . . powers essential to their quasi sovereign existence.”69 Steward
Machine thus seems to reject the temptation analysis and to em-
brace the sovereign accountability analysis.
Sovereign accountability also is at the heart of the Court’s re-
cent anti-commandeering cases—New York v. United States70 and
Printz v. United States.71 Both decisions support the principle that
coercion represents interference with sovereign accountability. In
New York, the Supreme Court addressed certain provisions in the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985
that were designed to induce the states to create plans for disposal
of radioactive waste within their own borders.72 The question was
whether the provisions unconstitutionally commandeered the
states by compelling them to “regulate in a particular field or a
particular way.”73 Congress may encourage, but may not direct,
65 Id. at 587.
66 Id. at 589.
67 Id. at 589-90. Courts and commentators alike have questioned the possibility of
divining a workable standard for detecting unconstitutional coercion. See id.; Nevada v.
Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990); Kansas v.
United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1196 (D. Kan. 1998), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 623 (2000);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 103 (2001); Hoke,
supra note 10, at 121; Sayers-Fay, supra note 38, at 1300-01. One observer even suggested
that, since coercion was difficult to discern, funding conditions should be more closely scru-
tinized under the relatedness restriction if there is a potential for coercion. See Mitchell,
supra note 12, at 191-93. Aside from its reliance on the financial inducement analysis in
order to determine coercion, the problem with this particular proposal is that it would cre-
ate an unacceptable disparity between states and criminal defendants in terms of ob-
taining relief from governmental overreaching. While the states might obtain relief from
federal interference by demonstrating “potential coercion,” criminal defendants who allege
they were coerced into confessing cannot obtain relief against either the state or federal
government without demonstrating actual coercion. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 285-86 (1991) (analyzing totality of circumstances to determine whether defendant
was coerced and applying harmless error); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(voluntariness of confession determined under totality of circumstances); United States v.
Springs, 17 F.3d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).
68 301 U.S. at 586.
69 Id. at 593.
70 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
71 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
72 505 U.S. at 144.
73 Id. at 161.
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the states to regulate.74 Permissible encouragement occurs when
the states retain the ability to choose whether to regulate accord-
ing to federal standards.75 When Congress encourages, “state gov-
ernments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences;
state officials remain accountable to the people.”76 When Congress
directs, states are prevented from responding to local prefer-
ences.77 The latter represents unconstitutional compulsion.
Critically for present purposes, the Court in New York used
the spending power as an example of how Congress “may urge a
State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal inter-
ests.”78 The conditions attached to receipt of federal funds allow
the federal government to influence state policy choices. If a state
“view[s] federal policy as sufficiently contrary to [its] local inter-
ests, then [it] may elect to decline the grant.”79 While New York
did not address specifically the Dole coercion loophole, it used the
terms coercion and compulsion synonymously, thereby suggesting
that the compulsion analysis in the anti-commandeering context
might apply to the coercion loophole in the spending context.80
The Court in Printz continued its protection of state sovereign
accountability by invalidating the interim provisions of the Brady
Act requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct back-
ground checks on prospective handgun purchasers. According to
the Court, these provisions “compel[led] the States to . . . adminis-
ter a federal regulatory program,” in violation of the “very princi-
ple of separate state sovereignty.”81 Like New York, Printz
emphasized that federalism protects “the States as independent
and autonomous political entities,”82 and that the essence of that
independence and autonomy is the ability of the states to make
decisions on behalf of their people and remain accountable to their
people.83
74 Id. at 161, 166-67.
75 Id. at 166-68.
76 Id. at 168.
77 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (“Accountability is . . . dimin-
ished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance
with the views of the local electorate in matters not preempted by federal regulation.”).
78 Id. at 166.
79 Id. at 168.
80 See Sayers-Fay, supra note 38, at 1300-01 (suggesting that the “compulsion in-
quiry” of New York and Printz was intended to replace the coercion inquiry under the
Spending Clause, with the result that, “however powerful conditions may be, they are con-
stitutional so long as states retain the formal option to opt out”).
81 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997) (quotation omitted).
82 Id. at 928.
83 Id. at 920 (“The Constitution . . . contemplates that a State’s government will re-
present and remain accountable to its own citizens.”); id. at 929-30 (Brady Act interfered
with state sovereign accountability because states will take blame for defects in federal
program even though it was not states choice to enact or enforce the federal program).
While the scope of the spending power was not before the Court, it did suggest spending
conditions might not be considered mandates. Id. at 917-18 (regulatory requirements “con-
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Under the principles of Mellon, Steward Machine, New York
and Printz, coercion and voluntariness are directly tied to a state’s
ability to respond to the will of its people (or to not respond and
risk that its people will hold it accountable). Where the state re-
tains the ability to determine whether to participate in a federal
program, which determination of course is based upon an assess-
ment of the impact of participation on the state’s chosen policies,
the state retains the ability to respond to and implement the will
of the local electorate.84  This ability represents the essence of sov-
ereignty, and should be the measure for unconstitutional coercion.
2. Coercion in the Spending Context
In the conditional spending context, states must decide
whether to participate in the federal program, and if they do par-
ticipate, they must abide by the conditions set down by Congress.
Several commentators have argued that the increased amount of
federal money involved in federal spending programs inevitably
affects the states’ decisions to participate in federal spending pro-
grams.85 While this assessment undoubtedly is true, it does not
lead inevitably to the conclusion that the amount of money at
stake compels the states to participate in the federal programs.
The amount of federal monies dangled in front of the states cer-
tainly and logically will inform the states’ respective decisions,
which likely is why the federal government offered the money in
the first place—to entice the states into cooperating with federally
chosen policies. But enticement does not equal coercion. As Stew-
ard Machine warned, we should not “confuse[ ] motive with
coercion.”86
Regardless of the amount of federal money at stake, a state
retains the ability to evaluate whether participation in the federal
nected to federal funding measures . . . can perhaps be more accurately described as condi-
tions upon the grant of federal funding than as mandates to the States”).
84 In addition to promoting the values of federalism, use of the Steward Machine, New
York and Printz principles in the spending context would signal consistency in the Court’s
federalism jurisprudence, thereby undermining claims that the Court invokes federalism
as a technique to inject the justices’ own values into the decision-making process. See
Krotoszynski, supra note 8, at 14, 24-25 (calling for the Court to “demarcate a meaningful
limiting principle” of federalism that would promote predictability, protect the states
“against the centralizing machinations of the federal government,” and defuse accusations
that the Court uses federalism to pursue the personal values of the justices).
85 Kaden, supra note 13, at 896 (“[G]iven the drastic increases in the amounts of fed-
eral funds and the formula-based entitlements in aid programs enacted since 1960, it is
unrealistic for anything to depend on the state’s nominal right not to participate.”); Albert
J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103,
1162 (1987) (“[W]ith the budgets of state and local governments now so greatly dependent
on federal money, the premise that the funds can readily be rejected if the condition is
deemed oppressive seems no longer realistic.”); Squire, supra note 8, at 907 (“Congress
maintains the ability to coerce the states, tempting them with precious resources.”).
86 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937).
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program promotes the state’s policy goals, as chosen by its people.
In deciding whether to participate, a state must determine
whether the conditions imposed by Congress would support or un-
dermine its chosen goals. If the federal conditions support state
goals, then the choice would appear relatively easy and the
amount of money at stake perhaps largely irrelevant.87 The choice
becomes more difficult, however, when the federal conditions un-
dermine state policy decisions. In that scenario the state then
must choose either to accept the federal money and frustrate
achievement of state policy choices, or to reject the federal money
and implement those local choices. The level of difficulty, of
course, corresponds to the amount of money involved in the fed-
eral program. The more money at stake, the more difficult the de-
cision. Nevertheless, as long as the state can evaluate its options
and choose the option most suitable to its needs, then the state’s
decision is voluntary.88
For example, in late 2000, Congress passed a law conditioning
the continued receipt of up to eight percent of a certain portion of
federal highway funds on the enactment of state legislation set-
ting .08 as the minimum blood alcohol content (“BAC”) for drunk
driving.89 As a result of this legislation the states must determine
whether the .08 BAC standard is consistent with their respective
state policies. If for some reason a state wants to impose either a
more liberal or a more stringent BAC standard, then that state
must decide whether its policy choice outweighs its need for the
forfeited portion of federal highway funding. If the state’s finan-
cial need is great, then its choice likely will be a difficult one as
the state will have to choose between its financial need and its
policy goals. As long as the state’s ability to make that choice re-
mains unimpaired, however, the choice is voluntary.
A state’s choice is not impaired simply because it perceives a
great fiscal need for federal funds.90 As sovereigns, states possess
the power to raise money by alternate means—taxation of their
87 See Baker, supra note 8, at 1935-36.
88 While the state might well experience a “prisoner’s dilemma” in choosing between
its financial needs and its policy goals, this dilemma does not undermine the validity of
federal spending legislation. The federal government has the power to spend for the gen-
eral welfare, and its power is expansive. South Dakota v. Dole, 453 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987).
Along with this power comes the responsibility to spend federal money in a manner consis-
tent with national policy goals, as determined by national policymakers in accordance with
the will of the people of the nation as a whole. While a state may disagree with the federal
policy choice, that disagreement does not render the federal government powerless to de-
clare its policy choice and to attempt to persuade the states to adopt it. Indeed, New York
implicitly recognized this point when it spoke approvingly of conditional federal spending.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
89 Making appropriations for the Department of Transportation and related agencies
for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes, 106 H.R. 5394, § 351
(2000).
90 But see, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 85, at 1162; Hoke, supra note 10, at 121-22.
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constituents.91 While a federal source of funds might be more po-
litically palatable to a state than taxing its own constituents, fed-
eral funding is not the only source of revenue for the state. Thus, a
state is not prevented from implementing its policy choices absent
federal funding. Professor Lynn A. Baker has argued that the
power to tax really does not aid the state in resisting federal pres-
sure, in part because some state laws restrict the state’s taxing
power, and thus the state’s ability to raise revenue.92 A state’s re-
striction on its own ability to raise revenue, however, represents a
policy decision chosen by the people, not one foisted upon them by
the federal government.93 Professor Baker also has argued that
the states’ taxing power represents an insufficient alternative to
federal funding because the states must stand second in line to the
federal government, which presumably means less money is avail-
able for the taking.94 While the states arguably might raise more
revenue through taxing its residents and property owners if the
federal government were not first in line, this does not mean that
the states are unable to raise sufficient funds to cover the cost of
not participating in a federal program.
When the federal government offers a significant amount of
funding in exchange for the state’s reordering of its policy choices,
the federal government presents a difficult choice to the state. The
federal government has not, however, altered the state’s ability to
make that choice. Using the principle applied in New York, the
federal government simply (and properly) has attempted to influ-
ence state policy choices. Such encouragement is permissible, as
New York explained, because it does not interfere with the state’s
decision-making process.95
On the whole, the lower federal courts have recognized the
principle that coercion relates to sovereign accountability, not fi-
nancial temptation, and accordingly have not used the Dole coer-
cion loophole to limit the spending power. Several courts have
91 See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1070 (1990) (“[C]an a sovereign state which is always free to increase its tax revenues ever
be coerced by the withholding of federal funds—or is the state merely presented with hard
political choices?”).
92 Baker, supra note 8, at 1936 n.129. Professor Baker also argues that when the fed-
eral government exercises its spending power, it offers money to the states, with condi-
tions, “that the state[s] readily could have obtained without those conditions through direct
taxation.” Id. at 1937. But this observation does not undermine the main point here, which
is that states retain the ability to invoke their sovereign taxing authority to raise revenue if
they are unwilling to accept the conditions attached to federal funds.
93 The Ninth Circuit recognized this point in Skinner: “Nevada is, of course, free to
raise tax funds in the manner of its own choosing . . . . However such restrictions [on its
ability to tax] are entirely self-imposed, and the state, as a sovereign entity, is free to
change its method of generating public income whenever the people wish to do so.” 884 F.2d
at 448 n.5.
94 Baker, supra note 8, at 1936-37.
95 See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
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rejected coercion arguments precisely because they doubted that
states could be coerced into participating in federal spending pro-
grams. For example, in California v. United States, California
challenged the federal Medicaid program, which conditioned
Medicaid funds on the provision of emergency medical service to
illegal aliens.96 California argued that while its initial decision to
participate was voluntary, “it now has no choice but to remain in
the [Medicaid] program in order to prevent the collapse of its med-
ical system.”97  In rejecting California’s argument, the Ninth Cir-
cuit questioned the “viability” of the Dole coercion theory, as well
as the possibility that any “sovereign state which is always free to
increase its tax revenues [could] ever be coerced by the withhold-
ing of federal funds.”98 Instead, the federal program likely
presented the state with “hard political choices.”99
The Tenth Circuit used similar reasoning in Kansas v. United
States to reject the state’s challenge to the Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families program and Child Support Enforcement Pro-
gram.100 Kansas argued that the sheer size of relevant grants —
$130 million annually in 1996 — “coerced [it] into implementing
[federal] program requirements.”101 Unmoved by the large amount
of money at stake, the court rejected the argument, noting that
several other courts reached similar conclusions in similar circum-
stances.102  Labelling the coercion theory “unclear” and “suspect,”
the court invoked the warning in Steward Machine that “motive or
temptation” should not be confused with coercion.103
California and Kansas reflect a trend in the case law against
finding coercion in the spending context. Like California and Kan-
sas, most courts addressing the coercion issue have ruled against
the state,104 with some even questioning their ability to determine
96 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997).
97 Id. at 1092.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 214 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 623 (2000).
101 Id. at 1198 ($130 million figure accounted for “66% of Kansas’ [Child Support En-
forcement] Program operating costs, and 80% of the expenditures relating to its computer-
ized data systems”).
102 Id. at 1201-02 (citing Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Cali-
fornia, 104 F.3d 1086; Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996); and Planned
Parenthood v. Dandoy, 810 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1987)).
103 Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1202.
104 See Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (“The sacrifice of
all federal education funds, approximately $250 million of 12[%] of the annual state educa-
tion budget . . . would be politically painful, but we cannot say that it compels Arkansas’
choice.”); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070
(1990) (no coercion when state would lose approximately 95% of its highway funding by
failing to enact a law setting 55 miles per hour as the maximum speed limit); Virginia v.
Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090 (1997) (no coercion when
state loses portion of federal highway funds for failing to comply with requirements of
Clean Air Act); Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (no coercion when state would lose
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whether “the states are faced . . . with an offer they cannot refuse
or merely a hard choice.”105 The reasoning of California and Kan-
sas and the general trend in the case law against finding coercion
undermine the validity of the financial inducement theory. De-
spite the rather large sums of money at stake, the courts generally
have declined to rule that federal spending programs unconstitu-
tionally coerce the states.106 These decisions accordingly support
the idea that coercion is absent when federal spending conditions
do not interfere with the states’ ability to make decisions on behalf
of their people.
Bucking the trend, the Fourth Circuit invalidated spending
legislation under the coercion loophole in Virginia Department of
Education v. Riley.107 For the reasons outlined below, this decision
uses faulty logic and ultimately fails to persuade. In Riley, Vir-
ginia challenged the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), which provides federal funding to state agencies that edu-
cate disabled students.108  In order to qualify for that funding, the
state agency must, among other things, “ ‘assure[ ] all children
with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public educa-
tion.’”109 The federal government sought to revoke its funding af-
ter discovering that Virginia maintained a policy of expelling or
suspending disabled students for behavior unrelated to the stu-
dent’s disability.110 In the federal government’s view, this policy
violated the state’s duty to provide a free public education to dis-
abled students. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the spending condi-
tion was ambiguous, and, in the alternative, that it was
coercive.111 Critical to its coercion ruling was the fact that Virginia
would lose all of its federal funding under the IDEA for refusing to
rescind its state policy.112 In the court’s eyes, the federal govern-
ment improperly used its financial muscle to impose federal policy
preferences on the states.113
all federal Medicaid funds for failing to follow certain requirements in Social Security Act);
North Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), judgment aff’d, 435 U.S. 962
(1978) (no coercion when state would lose only fifty million in federal health funds for fail-
ure to comply with requirements of National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act of 1974, since state revenues in a prior year totaled $3.1 billion). Cf. Padavan, 82 F.3d
at 28-29 (state not coerced under 10th Amendment to incur costs for services to poor because
not required to provide services; responsibilities arise, in part, out of state’s choice to par-
ticipate in Medicaid spending program).
105 Schweiker, 655 F.2d at 414; see also, e.g., Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448.
106 See supra note 104 (listing cases).
107 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 560 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §1412(1)).
110 Id. at 569 (federal government threatened to withhold $60 million, the full amount
of the annual special education grant).
111 Id. at 566-72.
112 Id. at 569-72.
113 Id. at 570-72.
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP103.txt unknown Seq: 20 15-MAY-01 13:09
182 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 4:163
Even under a financial inducement analysis, the Riley deci-
sion crucially fails to evaluate whether the federal spending pro-
gram actually coerced Virginia.  The federal funds at stake in
Riley—one hundred percent of the funds available under the
IDEA—represented only five percent of the funds necessary to ed-
ucate the state’s disabled students.114 It would appear, then, that
the financial pressure facing Virginia to accept the federal money
and abandon its policy choice was not all that great.115 Neverthe-
less, the court refused to give this argument credence, reasoning
instead that individual impact is irrelevant.116 What mattered was
that the federal government threatened to take away all of Vir-
ginia’s financing for a particular program when Virginia failed to
comply with a funding condition.117 Notably, while several other
courts have declined to enforce the coercion loophole precisely be-
cause of the difficulty (and necessity) of evaluating coercion on a
case-by-case basis,118 the Fourth Circuit does the exact opposite
and declares coercion to exist without examining the facts specific
to the underlying case.
The Riley court also fails to consider that, rather than coerc-
ing the states into adopting federal educational policy, the IDEA
merely presents the states with a choice—one that for some states
might be more difficult than for other states. Virginia had to
choose between maintaining the state’s chosen “disciplinary and
instructional tool for instilling in its especially recalcitrant stu-
dents the sense of responsibility they sorely lack,”119 and accepting
the federal funding. Given the apparent degree of devotion to its
educational policy,120 Virginia faced a difficult decision. But the
level of difficulty does not signal coercion. As long as Virginia
could decide which alternative better served the interests of its
people, then its decision was uncoerced.
114 Id. at 570.
115 Compare Virginia Dept. of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 570 (4th Cir. 1996) (coer-
cion when federal funds represented five percent of state education needs for disabled chil-
dren) with Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2000) (no coercion
when federal funds represented approximately 12% of state education budget); Kansas v.
United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 623 (2000) (no
coercion when federal funds represented approximately 66% of child support program oper-
ating costs and 80% of computer data systems expenditures); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d
445, 446 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990) (no coercion when federal funds
represented approximately 95% of state highway funds).
116 Riley, 106 F.3d at 570.
117 Id. The Fourth Circuit apparently believed that Virginia’s expulsion policy substan-
tially complied with the federal condition that fund recipients provide a “free appropriate
public education” to disabled students. Id. at 560, 570 (“[A] Tenth Amendment claim of the
highest order lies where, as here, the Federal Government . . . withholds the entirety of a
substantial federal grant on the ground that the states refuse to fulfill their federal obliga-
tion in some insubstantial respect.”).
118 See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
119 Riley, 106 F.3d at 571.
120 Id.
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In sum, Dole’s coercion loophole should not be used to limit
federal spending power.  The financial inducement analysis sug-
gested by Dole is not the proper test for coercion. Rather, the
proper test is whether the federal spending program prevents the
state from making decisions on behalf of its people. It is on that
basis which funding conditions should be evaluated.
B. The Inadequate Notice Loophole
Unlike the coercion loophole, Dole’s inadequate notice loop-
hole directly protects sovereign accountability. A state cannot
make a full and informed choice regarding whether to participate
in the federal program without understanding how the federal
program will impact the state’s own policy choices. Thus, the con-
ditions imposed on a state in exchange for the receipt of federal
funds are critical to a state’s decision. If Congress fails to describe
clearly the conditions of participation, it interferes with the state’s
decision-making process and the condition should not be enforced.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has likened federal spending legisla-
tion to a contract,121 holding that “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’
power to legislate under the spending power . . . rests on whether
the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the con-
tract.”122 In order “to impose a condition on the grant of federal
moneys, [Congress] must do so unambiguously.”123
Although ultimately unsuccessful, the views of four dissent-
ing justices in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education under-
score the importance of the inadequate notice loophole in
maintaining the federal balance.124 Davis involved a challenge to
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, which prohib-
ited sexual discrimination in educational programs or activities
that received federal funds.125 The question was whether “a recipi-
ent of federal education funding may be liable for damages under
Title IX under any circumstances for discrimination in the form of
student-on-student sexual harassment.”126 The answer to that
question turned on whether funding recipients had adequate no-
tice that they would be liable financially for certain instances of
121 Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“[L]egislation
enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for
federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”).
122 Id.
123 Id. The federalism principle underlying the notice requirement in the spending con-
text is akin to that underlying the clear statement rule applicable in the Eleventh Amend-
ment context. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (“Congress
may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only
by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”).
124 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 639.
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student-on-student harassment.127 Five members of the Court, led
by Justice O’Connor, ruled that Title IX provided adequate notice.
The prohibition against sexual discrimination in educational pro-
grams or activities receiving federal financial assistance included
a prohibition against “deliberate indifference to known acts of
peer sexual harassment,” making such indifference actionable
under Title IX.128
The dissent vigorously (and rightly) argued that the Court
should strictly interpret and enforce the notice requirement, call-
ing it a “vital safeguard for the federal balance.”129 The dissent
warned that, “if wielded without concern for the federal balance,
[the spending power] has the potential to obliterate distinctions
between national and local spheres of interest.”130  The dissenters’
views emphasize the important function served by the inadequate
notice loophole, and signal that at least four members of the Court
are interested in seriously reviewing spending conditions for com-
pliance with the notice requirement as a way of preventing federal
intrusion “in the most sensitive areas of traditional state
concern.”131
The Davis dissenters might have another opportunity to per-
suade their colleagues of their position, for a case before the Court
this Term might very well involve application of the inadequate
notice loophole. Alexander v. Sandoval raises the question
whether recipients of federal funding are subject to an implied pri-
vate right of action for violation of an implementing regulation of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.132 Title VI prohibits race
and national origin discrimination by recipients of federal fund-
ing, but does not specifically prohibit programs that result in a
disparate impact on groups of a certain race or nationality.133 In-
127 Id. at 640.
128 Id. at 648.
129 Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy was joined in dissent by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
130 Id. at 654. The private cause of action under Title IX is implied by the judiciary. Id.
at 656 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)). The dissent points out that
determining the scope of a judicially implied cause of action is particularly tricky when the
legislation is enacted under the spending power precisely because of the “significant ten-
sion with the requirement that the Spending Clause legislation give States clear notice of
the consequences of their acceptance of federal funds.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 656. In the dis-
sent’s view, Title IX in no way provided adequate notice that educational grant recipients
would be financially liable for failing to remedy student-on-student discrimination. Id.
131 Davis, 526 U.S. at 655.
132 121 S. Ct. 652 (2000).
133 Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 495-96 (11th Cir. 1999). Section 601 of Title VI
provides in relevant part as follows: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). In Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission of
City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), a majority of the Court, in a splintered decision,
concluded that section 601 requires a showing of intentional discrimination. Id. at 607-08
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stead, the implementing regulations to Title VI contain the dispa-
rate impact prohibition.134
From the viewpoint of the Davis dissenters, a legitimate ques-
tion could arise regarding whether implementing regulations pro-
vide the requisite notice under spending power principles.135
Indeed, that issue arose during oral argument before the Court.136
Because the notice requirement promotes federalism interests by
protecting state sovereign accountability, there is a strong argu-
ment that states should receive actual notice in the text of the
statute, rather than through an agency’s implementing regula-
tions.  Congress, not federal agencies, should shoulder the respon-
and n.1 (opinion of Powell, J., in which Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist, J., joined); id. at 612
(opinion of O’Connor, J.); id. at 634 (opinion of Stevens, J., in which Brennan and Black-
mun, JJ., joined).
134 Section 602 of Title VI delegates to federal agencies the power to implement regula-
tions enforcing Title VI. 42 U.S.C. §2000d-1 (2000). The Department of Justice regulation
at issue in Sandoval provides as follows:
A recipient, in determining the type of disposition, services, financial aid, benefits,
or facilities which will be provided under any such program, or the class of individ-
uals to whom, or the situations in which, such will be provided under any such
program, or the class of individuals to be afforded an opportunity to participate in
any such program, may not, directly or through contractual or other arrange-
ments, utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of sub-
jecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin,
or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program as respects individuals of a particular race, color, or na-
tional origin.  28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2000).
The Court also held in Guardians that the federal implementing regulations may proscribe
disparate impact discrimination, even when the text of the statute proscribes only inten-
tional discrimination. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 (White, J.); id. at 623 n. 15 (opinion of
Marshall, J.); id. at 634 (opinion of Stevens, J., in which Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.,
joined). See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1985) (explaining the Guardi-
ans decision).
135 To the Davis dissenters it is an open question whether implementing regulations
provide adequate notice under the Spending Clause. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 669 (“Even
assuming that [Department of Education] regulations could give schools the requisite no-
tice, they did not do so.”).
136 The following colloquy occurred during oral argument between Solicitor General
Seth P. Waxman and a member of the Court:
QUESTION: My only thought, [substantive regulations mandated by statute] may
have the force of law, but they may not have the force of the unequivocal for pur-
poses of the Spending Clause.
GENERAL WAXMAN: Well, I don’t think I can do better than simply to repeat
what I—the point I hope that I had made, which is, there is no case suggesting
that for purposes of enforcing a Spending Clause obligation there is a distinction
in recognizing a cause of action based on a statute, or on regulations that the fund-
ing agency is mandated to put forward. The principle—
QUESTION: But there’s no case suggesting there isn’t, either. I mean, I think
Justice Souter’s point was that this is an area where there is no precise authority
one way or the other.
GENERAL WAXMAN: Correct. What we have on our side is, I believe, a com-
pletely unbroken practice of enforcing obligations under both the Spending Clause
and otherwise equally, whether they arise within the four corners of the statute, or
under substantive regulations that are mandated by the statute.”
Transcript of Oral Argument Before Supreme Court of United States, 2001 WL 55359, at
**43-44 (99-1908) (January 16, 2001).
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sibility for making difficult policy decisions that implicate
sensitive federalism concerns.
Whatever the result in Sandoval, the Court’s analysis of the
notice issue should undertake serious evaluation of whether the
states had adequate warning that local regulations and policies
causing a discriminatory impact would subject the states to pri-
vate rights of action. Without such a warning, the states cannot be
said to have agreed to the condition, and should not be bound by
it.
C. The Insufficient Relatedness Loophole
The Court in Dole declined to delineate the “outer bounds” of
the relatedness requirement, concluding only that the minimum
drinking age condition was “directly related to one of the main
purposes for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate
travel.”137 In her dissent, Justice O’Connor disagreed with the
Court’s application of its relatedness standard, arguing that the
minimum drinking age was both “over and under-inclusive,” and
accordingly had “an attenuated or tangential” relationship with
the purpose of highway safety.138  She also appeared to urge the
adoption of a more strict relatedness standard—one that differen-
tiates between conditions that specify how the federal grant
should be spent, and those that do not.139 Conditions in the former
category would be sufficiently related to the federal program while
conditions in the latter category would not.140
The proper standard for relatedness, however, is irrelevant to
the question whether the insufficient relatedness loophole pro-
tects sovereign accountability. Whatever the degree of relatedness
between the funding condition and the purpose of the federal
funding program, it will not impact a state’s ability to make a
choice regarding whether to participate in the federal program. In
fact, with a modicum of effort states considering participation in a
federal spending program should be able to discern the degree of
relatedness between the funding condition and the purpose of the
federal program. Like the amount of funding at stake, the degree
of relatedness might very well impact a state’s ultimate decision.
137 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987). The Court specifically declined
to consider whether the ‘directly related’ standard was the minimum standard. Id.
138 Id. at 214-15 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
139 Compare id. at 216 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (appearing to offer new standard for
relatedness) with New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (mentioning the
relatedness requirement, but this time stating only that there must be “some relationship”
between the condition and the purpose of the federal spending program).
140 Dole, 483 U.S. at 215-16. For a persuasive critique of Justice O’Connor’s proposal,
see Engdahl, supra note 12, at 56-62 (arguing that it is far too strict, and that it “reiter-
ate[s] exactly the Butler majority’s monumental error, parading Madison in masquerade of
Hamilton once more”).
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It does not, however, literally prevent a state from knowingly
choosing for or against the federal program. So while courts might
enforce the insufficient relatedness loophole to achieve other
goals,141 they should not do so in order to protect the states from
interference with sovereign accountability.
In sum, sovereign accountability lies at the very heart of our
federalism structure. It protects individual liberty by ensuring
that the states are both responsive and accountable to their citi-
zens. While the Dole Court created three possible loopholes
through which federalism limits might emerge, only one—the in-
adequate notice loophole—actually protects and promotes sover-
eign accountability.
Part IV will consider an alternate justification for enforcing
some or all of the Dole loopholes. Specifically, Part IV argues that
regardless of whether the loopholes implicate sovereign accounta-
bility, they nonetheless should be enforced if enforcement would
encourage Congress to live up to its constitutional responsibility
to respect the federal balance.
IV. ENCOURAGING CONGRESSIONAL RESPECT FOR STATE
SOVEREIGN ACCOUNTABILITY
The judicial branch is not alone in its charge to protect our
federal structure. Congress too possesses a responsibility to mind
the federal balance. As Justice Kennedy asserted in his United
States v. Lopez concurrence, “the political branches [must not] for-
get that the sworn obligation to preserve and protect the Constitu-
tion in maintaining the federal balance is their own in the first
and primary instance.”142 When Congress fails in its responsibil-
ity, the courts step in to correct the balance.143 The threat of judi-
cial oversight, and possible invalidation of its legislative efforts,
likely would encourage Congress to pursue its constitutional pow-
ers in a manner that respects the federal balance.144 This incentive
is a desirable byproduct of judicial review, and provides a justifi-
cation for courts to weigh in on federalism issues.145 In addition to
141 See infra notes 153-67 and accompanying text.
142 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995).
143 Id. at 578 (“[T]he federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional struc-
ture and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene
when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far.”).
144 This ‘congressional encouragement’ idea is not grounded in a Garcia-type theory.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Unlike Garcia, it does
not leave the protection of federalism solely with Congress. Rather, it merely acknowledges
that judicial enforcement of federalism boundaries can serve the useful purpose of encour-
aging Congress to be mindful of its own limitations.
145 In a recent article on federalism, Professor Richard E. Levy noted this effect, calling
it the “political dynamics of federalism.” Levy, supra note 10, at 1664 (the Court’s federal-
ism jurisprudence has “effected a significant change in the political dynamics of federalism”
by forcing Congress to “exercise greater care in its choice of federal powers, develop the
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protecting sovereign accountability, the courts should enforce
rules that are designed to encourage Congress to mind federalism
limits in the first instance.
A. The Coercion Loophole
Invalidating spending legislation because of the weight of its
financial pressure on the states (to use the Dole definition of coer-
cion) would send a signal to Congress that it needs to be more
sensitive to state sovereignty concerns. It would remind Congress
to be cognizant of state interests and authority when it drafts leg-
islation. Nevertheless, there are compelling arguments against
using the Dole coercion loophole for this purpose. First, the Dole
coercion loophole would be too blunt an instrument to remedy con-
gressional insensitivity to federalism interests. While Congress
likely would get the message that it needs to take state interests
into account when legislating under the Spending Clause, the
price of communicating that message to Congress is too great, as it
would result in the invalidation of proper exercises of the spend-
ing power. As argued above in Part III, spending legislation does
not cross a constitutional line simply because it seduces the states
with financial assistance. Presenting the states with a hard choice
is Congress’s prerogative.146 Using the recent BAC legislation as
an example, those states that have both a great need for federal
funds and a state policy inconsistent with the .08 BAC standard
face a difficult choice, and ultimately one that might be decided in
favor of the particular state’s financial needs. However, as long as
the decision-making process remains unimpaired, coercion is ab-
sent. If the Riley decision provides any indication of how courts
would enforce the Dole coercion loophole, then the danger of un-
necessarily curbing Congress’s power is indeed too great.
Second, putting aside the question whether, as a general mat-
ter, courts should invalidate valid legislation as a means of en-
couraging Congress to be sensitive to federalism issues, courts
should not do so in this situation because it is difficult for Con-
gress to come up with finely calibrated and successful solutions to
financial coercion problems. Financial coercion must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.147 What is financially coercive to
necessary record to support its judgments, and express its conditions and requirements
clearly and explicitly”). See also Epstein, supra note 8, at 555 (Even if Lopez does not “re-
sult in any watershed change in congressional authority, it may enhance congressional
care and creativity in the evolving areas of federalism.”).
146 See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
623 (2000); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070
(1990); Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
147 See Skinner, 884 F.2d 445. But see Virginia Dept. of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559
(4th Cir. 1997).
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP103.txt unknown Seq: 27 15-MAY-01 13:09
2001] The Dole Loopholes 189
one state might not be financially coercive to another state.148 A
state with a budget surplus, for example, might not be subject to
coercion under the financial inducement theory.149 However, a
state without such a surplus would seem more vulnerable to Dole-
type coercion. If legislation is found coercive with respect to one
state, Congress can decrease the financial penalties for failure to
comply with the funding condition. It cannot, however, be sure
that its “fix” will not coerce another state that might be more de-
pendent on federal funds. Unlike problems with notice and relat-
edness, which are relatively easy to fix,150 problems with coercion
are not. If the goal of judicial intervention is to influence Congress
to regulate with due regard for states’ interests, sending Congress
back to the drawing board for violations of the coercion loophole
does not appear to be the most useful exercise.  If Congress cannot
easily fix the coercion problem, then invocation of the Dole coer-
cion loophole serves only to invalidate properly made democratic
choices.
B. The Inadequate Notice Loophole
Cases such as Davis and Sandoval invite welcome challenges
to spending conditions based on the inadequate notice loophole.151
This loophole directly protects federalism interests by enabling
states to make informed decisions regarding whether participa-
tion in a federal spending program will be consistent with the
wishes of their constituents. If a state persuades the Court to in-
validate a spending condition under the inadequate notice loop-
hole,152 that ruling wipes out the condition, leaving Congress free
148 Indeed, it is arguable that what is coercive to one state at a particular point in time
might not be coercive to that same state at an entirely different point in time.
149 See North Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. N.C. 1977), judgment aff’d,
435 U.S. 962 (1978) (no coercion when state would lose $50 million in federal health funds
and state revenues in prior year totaled $3.1 billion). Budget surpluses have become in-
creasingly common. See Ronald D. Picur, Managing Fiscal Slack: You have a Surplus . . .
Now What?, 16 GOV’T FIN. REV. NO. 3, at 7 (discussing how to deal with state budget sur-
pluses, and noting that “the National Association of State Budget Officers . . . reports that
fiscal year 2000 will represent the seventh consecutive year that general fund balances (on
average) will exceed 5% of annual expenditures”). Several states that have enjoyed recent
budget surpluses actually have offered to return some of the surplus to taxpayers. See Pat-
rick Cole, Sales-Tax Rebate Crosses Border [-] Wisconsin Extends Relief to Non-Residents,
but there’s a Catch, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1999, at 1 (“Wisconsin joins a number of other
states, including Minnesota, Alaska, Oregon, Missouri, that have had huge budget sur-
pluses in the past year and offered some sort of tax rebates.”).
150 See infra Part IV, at B, C.
151 See Levy, supra note 10, at 1655 (“At a practical level, it appears the key question
may be how clearly Congress must express the condition in order for the courts to recognize
it.”).
152 Justice O’Connor is the critical fifth vote in this area, and her role as the author of
Davis suggests that she would need to see a fairly egregious violation of the notice require-
ment before signing on with the Davis dissenters.
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to amend the spending statute to include the appropriate level of
clarity.
Aside from correcting problems with individual spending pro-
grams, use of the inadequate notice loophole provides guidance to
Congress regarding how to respect state boundaries and encour-
ages Congress to provide unambiguous notice of the spending con-
ditions before the courts step in. No matter what the outcome of
such challenges, whether it is knocking out an ambiguous condi-
tion or upholding an unambiguous condition, the challenges will
promote congressional compliance with the notice requirement.
Invalidating a funding condition obviously vindicates state inter-
ests. Even if the state is unsuccessful, the very act of challenging
the condition serves the worthwhile purpose of keeping Congress
in check. It reminds Congress to consider the federalism implica-
tions of its legislation, and encourages Congress to legislate
within constitutional limitations.
Improving the clarity of conditions in spending legislation
should prove a much easier task than eliminating financial coer-
cion. Using the Sandoval case as an example, if the Court were to
prohibit disparate impact suits against the states because of the
lack of adequate notice in the text of Title VI, it should be fairly
simple for Congress to redraft the statute to make clear that the
prohibition against discrimination contained in the statute itself
covers both discriminatory intent and effect, and that fund recipi-
ents will be subject to suit under both theories. Because clarity is
an objective concept, once Congress successfully redrafts the stat-
ute to provide unambiguous notice, the statute should not be sub-
ject to later attack by other fund recipients.
C. The Insufficient Relatedness Loophole
Like the inadequate notice loophole, enforcing the insufficient
relatedness loophole will encourage Congress to be sensitive to
federalism boundaries. By requiring a sufficient degree of related-
ness between the spending condition and the purpose of the fed-
eral spending program, the relatedness requirement represents a
limit on the substance of the conditions Congress may impose on
the funding recipients. Thus, it implicitly acts as a limit on the
extent to which federal legislation may intrude upon traditional
state concerns. Only those conditions with a sufficient nexus to
the purpose of the federal spending program will be tolerated. Ac-
cordingly, enforcing the relatedness requirement should serve to
encourage Congress to craft conditions that, while achieving the
federal purpose, also respect federalism boundaries.
Here the standard for relatedness becomes relevant, since the
standard for any rule must be informed by the purpose the rule is
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designed to achieve. Justice O’Connor is not alone in calling for a
more strict relatedness standard.153 Critics of Dole argue that a
more rigorous standard is necessary in order to rein in the reach
of federal power.154 In Justice O’Connor’s view, a loose relatedness
requirement would “render academic the Constitution’s other
grants and limits of federal authority.”155 She accordingly pro-
posed a relatedness standard that would distinguish between
spending conditions stating how the federal money should be
spent156 and spending conditions that regulated the states.157 The
former always would be permissible, and the latter would be per-
missible only when valid under Congress’s other enumerated pow-
ers.158 In Justice O’Connor’s view, the legislation in Dole fell in the
latter category as it was simply “a regulation determining who
shall be able to drink liquor.”159 Thus, to be valid it must fall under
one of Congress’s other enumerated powers.
Professor Baker also proposed a relatedness standard de-
signed to limit federal overreaching. Her proposal would invali-
date spending conditions that “regulate the states in ways that
Congress could not directly mandate,” unless the spending pro-
gram constitutes “reimbursement spending.” Reimbursement
spending legislation specifies the purpose of the federal spending
program and reimburses the state for its expenses in achieving
that purpose.160 Professor Baker’s proposal limits (but does not
eliminate) Congress’s ability to use its spending power to circum-
vent the limitations on its other enumerated powers.161
On the other side of the spectrum is Professor Engdahl, who
has argued against having a relatedness requirement. In his view,
a relatedness requirement is unnecessary and contradicts the
Hamiltonian view of the spending power by restricting the pur-
poses for which Congress may spend: “[A]ny time the notion of a
germaneness requirement is even taken seriously it puts Hamil-
ton and his view of the spending power out of reach.”162
153 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 8, at 1962-68; Mitchell, supra note 12, at 193-94.
154 483 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Baker, supra note 8, at 1962-
68.
155 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
156 As an example of this type of condition, Justice O’Connor cites Oklahoma v. Civil
Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947), in which the Court upheld a provision of the
Hatch Act prohibiting political activities by state employees whose employment was funded
at least in part by federal funds. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217.
157 Dole, 483 U.S. at 215-16 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 218.
160 Baker, supra note 8, at 1962-63.
161 Professor Baker’s proposal does not limit Congress’s spending authority to its enu-
merated powers; Congress may spend for purposes beyond its enumerated powers, as long
as the spending simply reimburses the states for its efforts to achieve the federal spending
purpose. Baker, supra note 8, at 1966-67.
162 Engdahl, supra note 12, at 54-62; id. at 62.
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Despite these criticisms of the standard applied in Dole,163
this article endorses the Dole standard for two reasons: First, it
best reflects the purpose of the relatedness requirement, and sec-
ond, it preserves the broad scope of the spending power. The
spending power permits Congress to spend in the name of the gen-
eral welfare.164 In exercising that power, Congress may reach be-
yond, and is not limited by, its other enumerated powers.165
Accordingly, any definition of relatedness that limits the substan-
tive scope of the general welfare phrase to those objects contained
within the other enumerated powers, as would the proposal by
Justice O’Connor and, to some extent, the proposal by Professor
Baker, would cut back on the legitimate, sanctioned scope of the
spending power.166 Rather than limiting the purposes for which
Congress may spend (and thereby limit the definition of general
welfare), the relatedness requirement should be interpreted as
limiting the range or substance of conditions Congress may im-
pose when it enacts spending legislation that is within the broad
scope of the spending power. This interpretation of the related-
ness requirement would limit Congress’s ability to interfere with
state authority when it spends for the general welfare, but would
not limit the general welfare phrase.
While admittedly not an overly stringent standard, the Dole
standard nevertheless imposes a limit on congressional options.
Under this standard, for example, Congress would not be permit-
ted to condition federal highway funds on the states’ agreement to
provide subsidized general medical care to the elderly. It is diffi-
cult to conceive of any purpose of federal highway spending that
directly relates to the need to maintain the general health of our
nation’s elderly. The Dole standard accordingly establishes some
limits on Congress’s ability to interfere with state prerogatives
when invoking its spending power. At the same time, however, the
direct relationship standard preserves the broad scope of the
spending power permitted under the Constitution, because it does
not attempt to limit spending purposes to those embodied in the
other enumerated powers.
Finally, unlike enforcement of the Dole coercion loophole, en-
forcement of the insufficient relatedness loophole does not cut
back on congressional authority in the spending context, since a
baseline requirement for all federal legislation is that the means
163 The Dole Court found that the condition in Dole was directly related to the purpose
of the federal spending program—highway safety. It declined to address, however, whether
spending conditions must be “directly related” to the purpose of the federal funding pro-
gram, or whether a less direct relationship would suffice. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 n.3. This
article supports the ‘direct relationship’ standard that was applied in Dole.
164 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
165 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
166 See Engdahl, supra note 12, at 61-62.
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(here the condition) rationally relate to the ends (here the purpose
of the federal spending program).167 The relatedness requirement
already exists as a limit on congressional power, and it has the
added benefit here of encouraging Congress to take federalism
concerns seriously.
CONCLUSION
The evidence suggests that the Supreme Court’s recent feder-
alism campaign will (and should) make one of its next stops at the
Spending Clause. The logical question, then, is how the spending
power ought to be limited in order to protect federalism interests.
The Court created three possible federalism loopholes in its
Spending Clause analysis that might be utilized either to impose
federalism-based limitations or to encourage Congress to be more
sensitive to federalism boundaries and concerns. This article ar-
gues that, of the three loopholes, only the inadequate notice and
insufficient relatedness loopholes ought to be used to promote fed-
eralism interests.
The Dole coercion loophole, which the states have pushed
rather heavily in recent litigation, should not be used to limit fed-
eral spending power. As defined in Dole to mean financial induce-
ment, that loophole would seem to invalidate any federal program
that is simply too good to pass up. In the federalism context, how-
ever, coercion is not about financial pressure or inducement;
rather, it is about preserving the states’ sovereign accountability.
It is about protecting the ability of the states to make decisions
implementing the will of the people, and being accountable for
those decisions. No matter how much financial pressure a state
might feel to take part in a federal program, the federal program
is not coercive as long as it does not disable the state from choos-
ing how best to serve the interests of its people. Moreover, even
though use of the coercion loophole might actually encourage Con-
gress to be less aggressive in its use of financial conditions, the
coercion loophole is too strong a medicine to cure congressional
insensitivity because it would cut too far into the legitimate scope
of the spending power.
The inadequate notice loophole, on the other hand, should be
utilized to promote federalism interests. Requiring sufficient leg-
islative notice regarding the consequences of participating in the
spending program enables a state to make choices on behalf of its
people. Moreover, invoking this federalism loophole encourages
167 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-3, at 805 (3d
ed. 2000) (The rational relationship standard enunciated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), “is the primary standard for judicial review of legislative
action.”).
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Congress to draft its legislation more carefully, with due regard
for the states’ interests. And while the insufficient relatedness
loophole does not impact the states’ ability to implement the will
of their constituents, it should be invoked in order to influence
Congress to be sensitive to federalism concerns, thereby limiting
the intrusion into state sovereignty.
The inadequate notice and insufficient relatedness loopholes
provide the Court ample leeway to implement its federalism goals.
As the Davis dissenters pointed out, the notice requirement is a
“vital link” in preserving federalism. Similarly, the relatedness re-
quirement, as applied in Dole, should allow the Court to invalidate
programs that unduly interfere with state interests, because it
prohibits conditions that bear no direct relationship to achieving
the purpose of the spending program. Strictly enforcing these re-
quirements will go a long way toward protecting the federal
balance.
